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It’s almost midday on Friday; about one hundred people mass together beneath shady eucalyptus 
trees in a wasteland on the edge of one of Rosario’s western main streets (a working-class, 
formerly industrialized area).1 Neighbors and passersby walk without stopping: the place is said 
to be dirty and dangerous, attended by “ragmen (cartoneros), the unemployed and other 
indigents.”2 Yet, for some years now, this former rubbish dump has been converted into a hot 
spot of Rosario’s popular economy, where people frantically buy and sell almost everything. 
Women from Rosario’s northern suburbs pool their funds to rent small vans in which they carry 
the many products they buy and sell, most of them from wholesalers; they also carry chairs and 
tables that make up their stands. Others bring horse- or hand-drawn carts from the surrounding 
slums; they sell fruits and vegetables they salvaged from wholesale markets nearby, defective 
industrial products such as broken biscuits, or damaged canned food or homemade cleaning 
products. Many others sell used cloth on the ground, along with items they received as payment 
in kind for daily casual labor (changas) or as poverty relief in kind offered by the municipality or 
some local church. 
Beyond the ambient turmoil, this place merits attention for at least two reasons. First, 
transactions are carried out through the use of bills denominated in their own unit of account, the 
crédito. These local currencies lubricate trueque (barter networks), because of their historical 
affiliation to a wider set of monetary experiments. From 1995 to 2002, a broad spectrum of 
activists, churches, neighborhood associations, and local politicians issued their own currencies 
“from below” and formed a federated structure (known as Red Global de Trueque, for Global 
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Barter Network, or RGT): ferias clustered in geographical zones and each zone issued its own set 
of bills denominated in créditos, which were accepted in all the RGT ferias (Saiag 2013). The 
number of participants in trueque grew rapidly, as low-income populations were increasingly 
excluded from the national currency (peso) due to rising income inequality and cash shortage 
resulting from peso–US dollar parity. (It is considered the world’s largest experiment in local 
currencies, with an estimated two million participants; Ould-Ahmed 2010). However, it got into 
a deep hyperinflation crisis from June to September 2002: since then, it has partially recovered at 
a more localized level, as the federated structure disappeared (Orzi 2012). 
In 2009, when the fieldwork on which this chapter is based was carried out, two such 
currencies circulated around Rosario’s urban agglomeration, exclusively at weekly market places 
(feria). The créditos in use in the wasteland described above also circulated in two other 
biweekly ferias, located in Rosario’s western periphery (in a public square and a neighborhood 
association). While previously 50 créditos were allocated to each new participant, it is now 
necessary to pay 10 pesos to one of the feria’s “coordinators” to gain access to 8,000 newly 
issued créditos. Acceptance of crédito bills was taken for granted, since nobody questioned the 
legitimacy of the nurse who issued them, as the founder of the Santa Fe provincial trueque (she 
contracted a printer to protect the bills from falsification). However, no formal organization runs 
trueque in Rosario, beyond interpersonal ties between the bills’ issuers and each feria’s 
coordinator. Other crédito bills circulate in three weekly ferias located in Capitán Bermúdez, a 
small town in Rosario’s northern suburbs (the agglomeration’s most industrialized area, due to 
the presence of many harbors). Créditos are issued by an association created for “the liberation 
of the poorest,” Poriajhú (which stands for “the poor” in Guarani), which also runs various other 
activities, such as a radio station, school tutoring, an adult literacy scheme, microcredit 
programs, etc. Contrary to what happens in Rosario, participants are offered a fixed amount of 
créditos when they first attend a feria. 
The second striking element about trueque is that it is a women’s world. Indeed, women 
are greatly overrepresented: field research reveals that they represented more than two-thirds of 
trueque participants in 2000–2002 (see e.g. Gonzales-Bombal 2002: 285; Leoni 2003: 29; 
Bogani and Parysow 2005). This proportion grew significantly after the trueque crisis, reaching 
85 percent in 2004 in Buenos Aires’s western suburbs (Gomez and Helmsing 2008: 2596; 
Pereyra 2007). During my fieldwork, no men ever participated in the Poriajhú trueque, while 
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only a few did so in Rosario—and if they did, they came with their wives. Moreover, women 
also managed the trueque: in both localities, no male was in charge of the feria’s coordination or 
of issuing money. 
I wish to reflect here on the gender of money. I observed the daily financial practices of 
eighteen households of which at least one member participated in trueque and I conducted in-
depth interviews with each of them to better understand intrahousehold transactions (interviews 
were carried out with women, and sometimes also with their husbands). The chapter’s aim is 
twofold. On the one hand, the differences between monetary practices carried out by adult men 
and women reveal social hierarchies based on gender, since men and women do not enjoy the 
same rights over income generation and expenditure. On the other hand, I ask how much 
women’s use of local currencies challenges gender norms that we might consider to be 
oppressive. In this respect, trueque is an interesting case study, since its history coincides with a 
crisis of household financial management among the urban, industrial working class (Absi 2007). 
Indeed, until the mid-1990s, most of Rosario’s working-class male workforce benefited from 
Fordist wage labor relations, which provided households with a secure and stable source of 
income. The emergence of trueque in the town in 1998 occurred along with a transformation in 
these employment relations, which led women to assume a greater role in financial matters. 
The chapter is structured around two main arguments. The first, developed in the opening 
three sections, is that the use of local currencies by women allows them to contest gender 
hierarchy in a limited way. Ferias are characterized by a specific kind of social relationship, 
different from relations within households: at a given time and place, status and gender 
inequalities are suspended, as market transactions require participants to act as if they were 
interchangeable (first section). Participation in trueque also leads to a limited transformation of 
households’ financial organization. On the one hand, incomes obtained in this way tend to 
contest husbands’ monopoly of income and control over their wives’ expenditure. On the other 
hand, participation in trueque goes along with redefinition of the frontier between masculine and 
feminine monies, which does not allow more egalitarian models of household financial 
management to emerge (second section). Finally, if there is a degree of women’s liberation, 
participation in trueque also acts as a source of social differentiation between women, because 
they do not engage in the ferias with the same initial endowments. Indeed, when ferias are based 
on competition between participants, the most mobile of them enjoy privileged access to money, 
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as they can take advantage of price differences between the peso (national currency) and crédito 
spheres, to the detriment of the poorest participants (third section). This conclusion leads to a 
second argument: in order to grasp the potential of liberation through money, we must focus on 
the (always contextual) modalities of access to it. Indeed, money is likely to mediate a wide 
range of social relations, according to the contexts in which its uses are embedded (e.g. Parry and 
Bloch 1989; Zelizer 1994). If we want money to subvert gender hierarchy, we should treat it as a 
common good.3 
A Temporary Suspension of Class and Gender Identities 
The most striking effect of women’s participation in trueque is the creation of a specific social 
space, the feria, clearly delimited in time and space. Ferias are usually spaces of socialization for 
women (González Bombal 2002), where they indulge in a kind of therapy allowing them to 
escape from the worries of daily life (Bogani and Parysow 2005). Following Michèle de La 
Pradelle (2006) and Jean-Michel Servet (2009), I argue that ferias are constitutive of a specific 
kind of social relationship, characterized by the temporary suspension of gender and class 
identities. This stems from the interchangability in market transactions. La Pradelle, writing 
about Carpentras market places, claims: 
Market exchange is itself a social relation of a certain type. Whether people are negotiating 
the price of truffles, artworks, or tomatoes, goods-value exchange defines a situation where, 
during a given stretch of time, in a particular place, and for that particular activity, the 
actors recognize each other as equivalent partners no matter how unequal they may 
otherwise be in terms of power and status. All such partners accept the rules of the game, 
the first of which is that none may claim any kind of advantage or privilege external to the 
exchange situation. Or course, each “player” has his and her hand (the quality of the 
merchandise or the art of displaying it to advantage, buying power, acted indifference, and 
so on), but each is also just as worthy as any other. In such ephemeral society of buyers and 
sellers, all are alike and recognized as such. People have no names or qualities, at least in 
principle. (2006: 5, emphasis added) 
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I discovered this long after I experienced difficulty in obtaining interviews with trueque 
participants. Admittedly, during the ferias (for a short time), they were very talkative. It was easy 
to joke and speak about unimportant topics (such as the weather) or even about the products they 
offered and others looked for(participants’ answers often exceeded my expectations). I faced 
embarrassed refusals, however, as soon as I proposed an interview. All avoided this without 
offering any explanation. The fact that I was a man in an environment characterized by strong 
conservatism with regard to gender relations may partly explain this. But this hardly explains all 
my difficulties: even unmarried women (single, widowed, divorced, or too young to be married) 
refused an interview. My main problem was probably wanting to ask people to reveal their 
identity (their history, social ties, and activities outside trueque). I transgressed the foundational 
rule of market transactions—individuals behave as if they are interchangeable like the 
commodities they buy and sell. 
The principle of interchangeability between trueque participants does not mean that class 
differences are ignored. Rather, they are neutralized, so they do not interfere with the 
transactions. This effect is obtained through dramatization of formal equality: during the ferias, 
participants greet each other warmly, despite obvious differences among them (slum dwellers 
used to come to the feria by horse cart). Likewise, each participant makes an effort to treat all 
others on an equal footing: anyone is likely to buy and to sell to/from a neighbor regardless of 
who they are (prices are the same for everyone, without distinction). That is how ferias bring 
together people from very different backgrounds who would not be mixed in any other social 
sphere: small shopkeepers, women who live in a popular neighborhood and run their own home-
based informal selling, but also street vendors and marginal people forced to rely on casual labor 
who live in Rosario’s peripheral slums. 
Likewise, the prevalence of the principle of interchangeability during the ferias does not 
mean that personal ties are unimportant. Trueque participants deploy complex individual 
strategies to build and take advantage of long-term interpersonal trust in their commercial 
relationships. Clientele bonds allow cotraders to obtain key information about ferias (date, time, 
and locale of new ferias, the prices of commodities, and good deals). They are used first and 
foremost to secure households’ access to food: because food supplies within the feria are very 
precarious, many participants agree on what they will sell to each other or swap during the next 
feria (Drelon 2009; the first preoccupation of participants is to pay off their debts or recover 
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them). Moreover, when cotraders have already transacted before, sales are often carried out on 
credit. In this case, a claim is noted down in the creditor’s notebook, and the debt is settled 
during the next ferias, through repayment in créditos or in kind. However, such personal ties do 
not challenge the principle of interchangeability itself, since mutual acquaintance is usually 
limited to the ferias. Ignoring almost everything about other participants’ identities, it is usual to 
name them by the commodity they offer (“the one who sells fruits and vegetables,” “the one who 
sells juice,” etc.), rather than use their names or surnames. In addition, class and gender identities 
are certainly suspended because they resurface as soon as the feria finishes. During a feria 
people take care not to slander their neighbors, but discourses take another turn when they reach 
home. The poorest participants, usually mixed-race indigenous people living in Rosario’s slums, 
are the target of a discriminatory speech: their poverty is attributed to their laziness; they are 
“dirty,” “unproductive,” and “abuse child labor.” 
The equality prevailing during the ferias could be criticized for its fictitious nature. 
However, the targets of this discriminatory discourse may experience it positively: the feria’s 
formal equality takes them out of their daily worries into a utopian world of individuals. That is 
what Andrea4 (a regular feria participant) argues: “Yes, I love attending trueque. I really like the 
ferias, because many things happen. I am not thinking ‘what the hell, domestic worries!’ 
Suppose that I’m in bad shape, well, trueque distracts me. And when the feria ends, all [my 
problems] come back into my head. . . . But it makes you think about something else, I love it. If 
there could be other [ferias], I would go!” (interview, 24 November 2009). Because of its formal 
equality, the feria contrasts profoundly with the domestic world to which women are usually 
confined: the latter is made up of hierarchical relations from which it is hard for them to free 
themselves. Budget management epitomizes this point. 
Challenging the Prevailing Normative Model of Budget Management 
The participation of women in the trueque also challenges gender hierarchies through its impact 
on households’ financial organization. The normative model prevailing among Rosario’s 
working class reproduces gender-based dominations, as wives and children are supposed to rely 
entirely on their husbands’ or father’s incomes. Indeed, husbands are considered as the only 
legitimate purveyors of money in the household. Wives, in turn, are supposed to manage the 
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money they receive from their husbands on their household’s name, as Pascale Absi observed 
among miners in Potosí (Bolivia). This gendered division of household’s budget management 
also goes in hand with a spatial division of labor: “men work, women stay at home,” in charge of 
daily domestic tasks (Absi 2007: 357). 
Yet the impact of women’s participation in the trueque on household’s financial 
organization is ambiguous. On the one hand, it weakens the two foundations of the prevailing 
normative model of budget management: husbands’ monopolization of monetary income and the 
lack of differentiation between wives and household expenses.5 In this way, participation in the 
trueque implies a greater financial autonomy for women. On the other hand, the significance of 
such financial autonomy is limited, because trueque participation also engenders a redefinition of 
the frontier between masculine and feminine monies, rather than its eradication. That is why 
recourse to the trueque is said to be a mean of “bypassing” (Guérin 2008) gender hierarchies, 
along with other monetary practices: these practices do not conform to the prevailing normative 
model of household financial management, but they do not confront it on an explicit basis and 
are not recognized as legitimate. 
Bypassing the Husband’s Monopoly of Income 
With regard to husbands’ supposed monopoly of income, none of the households I interviewed 
fully conformed to this model. Two elements account for this. First, workers’ employment 
conditions have worsened considerably since the 1990s, as protected wage-labor relations 
(characterized by long-term employment and social protection coverage) were weakened by 
lower real wages, greater income inequality, and informal employment (Sosa 2007; Damill, 
Frenkel, and Maurizio 2011; Rofman and Lucchetti 2006). Access to money became more scarce 
and irregular. As a result, it is no longer possible for a husband’s wages alone to meet the 
household’s financial needs. Second, wives and children resisted patriarchal domination as 
expressed by his monopoly of income. Children often generate their own sources of income now, 
sometimes on the sly; many of them sell miscellaneous items (above all, food) on the street or 
accumulate and sell recyclable goods (such as cardboard or plastic bottles) in order to avoid 
having to ask for money from their parents to go dancing or to buy a bicycle or beauty products. 
Wives also contribute to household income. Some of them have begun to help their husband at 
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work without being paid, through home-based car washing and in T-shirt dyeing workshops (on 
the other hand, children are always paid for such work). All other adult women had their own 
source of income, in pesos obtained through informal activities—either as wages (mainly for 
housework and in sewing shops) or self-employment as street vendors, in small home-based 
general stores: kiosko, sewing, home bakery, etc.). In this last case, entrepreneurship goes with 
women’s control over specific short-term financial circuits aimed at managing their working 
capital. Women’s participation in trueque reinforces this tendency, as they control all income in 
créditos. 
However, the patriarchal model of financial management still shapes household financial 
organization. First, for women, marriage means exclusion from wage-labor. Indeed, only three 
women (out of eighteen) had this kind of employment (in a sewing shop, a supermarket, and as a 
secretary in a transport company); but they all had to abandon their job when they got married, as 
wage-labor is hardly compatible with housework, which limits wives’ mobility. Second, incomes 
generated by wives are much lower than those generated by their husbands (even if it is hard to 
obtain precise data6), and their contribution to the household budget is usually considered as 
extra income. Only those women who were not married (being either a widow, divorced, or a 
single adult) contributed substantial income (in pesos) to their household.7 Only one interviewee 
was in this situation while she lived with her concubine. Third, and most important, wives’ 
income generation is usually not legitimate in the eyes of their husbands. The latter were 
sceptical about their wives’ chances of success in business: “my husband did not believe I could; 
he asked me [ironically], ‘how long will your business [selling clothes] last? One or two 
months?’” (Alicia); and “my husband reproaches me for sewing all the daylong” (Samanta). In 
one case, disputes over a woman’s income led to divorce: 
When I knew him [her future husband], I was ashamed to tell him that I used to sell 
[miscellaneous articles in the street]. . . . I told him two years after we began to go out. . . . 
Every time my boyfriend wanted to come, I said I had to babysit my niece, but it was false: 
I had to go out selling. When we decided to marry, he told me “when you marry me, you 
will have to stop selling.” . . . That is when the conflicts began. He wanted to manage my 
life, but I did not go along with it [me queria manejar, pero a mi no me maneja nadie]. 
(Interview with Mónica, Capitán Bermúdez, October 2009) 
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Women’ use of trueque to challenge budgetary patriarchy is first by confronting the 
social norm that only husbands should supply all of a household’s income. Through trueque, 
women get to control part of household income that they are not supposed to control; it is same 
with their access to other short-term financial circuits in pesos. However, this does not turn 
budgetary patriarchy inside out, since the women do not call into question the sexual division of 
labor itself. Wives are still dedicated to household reproductive work (créditos obtained through 
trueque contribute almost exclusively to a household’s food supply); and men still enjoy a 
monopoly of formal wage labor. Moreover, even as these practices bypass traditional norms, 
they go hand in hand with creating new boundaries between masculine and feminine monies, as 
financial circuits managed by women involve only small amounts and daily or weekly cycles. 
Trueque reinforces this tendency, since women’s incomes are in a separate unit of account 
(créditos). This in turn reproduces the idea of the peso as masculine money. 
Bypassing the Husband’s Control over Expenditure 
Women’s participation in trueque challenges their husbands’ control over expenditure made by 
other household members. But it also reinforces the existing gendered division of money use. 
A second difference between masculine and feminine monies may be observed in how 
husbands’ income is partially deindividualized when it is transferred to wives (Carsten 1989). 
Because incomes are supposed to be controlled by husbands and spending is their wives’ affair, 
transfers are a key element in household finances. These transfers took three forms as 
exemplified by the following cases: 
(1) The first and most evident case of a wife’s submission to her husband: Elisandra has to ask 
her husband (a car mechanic) for money every morning. He rarely gives her enough money (in 
pesos) to pay for the household’s daily expenses. So she has to negotiate for any extras and her 
husband closely controls the household’s spending. In addition, Elisandra cannot influence her 
husband’s spending, since she does not know how much he earns. 
(2) The second concerns Celina, Jorge (her husband), and their three children; it is characteristic 
of households where the husband earns a weekly wage: expenditures are compartmentalized to 
adapt to the temporality of Jorge’s remuneration. As soon as he receives his income as a self-
employed construction worker every Thursday, he transfers 600 pesos to Celina, who 
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immediately carries out her weekly food shopping: she spends 100 pesos on meat, another 100 
pesos each on fruits, vegetables, and staples (pasta, rice, tomato puree, flour, etc.)—that is, 400 
pesos in all. The remaining 200 pesos are put in a separate envelope to pay for other 
miscellaneous expenses and monthly spending on electricity, water, taxes, and rent. 
(3) Husbands commonly transfer part of their income to their wives through a system of 
envelopes and notebooks. They used to do this when they were paid (usually around the 5th and 
20th of each month). Now only part of a husband’s income is transferred in this way, since they 
usually retain a sum of money for their personal expenses (transport to work, lunch, alcohol, 
games of chance, etc.). Wives immediately put the money (in cash) in a box or an envelope. On 
the 5th they might put in separate envelopes money for fixed costs (most of them being paid at 
the beginning of the month). The wives and children use what’s left for their daily expenses, but 
they have to note down each expense in a notebook or in the envelope itself (usually, with the 
date, item[s] bought, and the cost). When their husbands’ monetary needs exceed the sum they 
did not transfer to their wives, they can usually draw on the envelope or box; in this case, they 
just note down that this is for their personal expenses. 
 
The money transferred to a wife through these mechanisms is said to be “general” (which may 
refers to the unity of the household); it is then “divided” by wives when it is spent or assigned to 
specific expenditures. 
Men’s and women’s monies do not have the same status. In each case, part of a husband’s 
spending escapes from his wife’s control: husbands are not expected to transfer all their income 
to their wives. (In addition, wives hardly know how much their husbands earn, because there is 
no pay slip and informal incomes fluctuate.) Moreover, while household expenditure is noted 
down, husbands can withdraw money from the envelope without specifying its purpose: they 
only have to note that it is for their personal expenses. Yet wives do not have this privilege since 
their expenses are merged with the household’s: all such expenses are made by women and none 
of the expenses in the notebook are made in their name. In addition, wives’ household expenses 
are subject to their husbands’ control: “If Luis wants to know what I spend, he just has to look at 
the notebook” (Adela). Thus, through the way it is spent, money expresses the respective 
position of husband and wife within the household (Guérin 2002; Zelizer 1994: chap. 6). 
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The domestic dimension of wives’ money is reinforced by how spending responsibilities 
are allocated (Johnson 2004) and the gendered basis of saving. Even if women carry out (almost) 
all of the expenditures related to daily reproduction, spouses distinguish between husbands’ and 
wives’ responsibilities.8 The former take care of significant and sometimes irregular expenses, 
such as monthly fixed costs (rent, taxes, phone, gas, etc.) and buying building materials to 
improve the house. The latter are responsible for smaller but more regular expenditures, such as 
children’s clothing and, above all, food.9 Likewise, wives’ savings and debts fill short-term gaps 
between income and expenditure. Husbands, for their part, are responsible for accumulating 
large quantities of recyclable materials (such as iron, zinc, copper, cardboard, plastic or glass 
bottles, etc.); these can be sold by weight in order to finance lifecycle events (e.g., marriages, 
funerals, birthdays, and fiestas de quince) or to protect households from loss of income and 
unpredicted increases in financial needs. 
Women’s participation in trueque can thus be considered a way of partially bypassing 
gender norms of financial management through how créditos are spent. Indeed, the créditos 
earned through trueque are not added to the envelope or boxes mentioned above. For this reason, 
wives do not give a public account of their expenses in créditos. (In addition, men do not usually 
understand the crédito economy because prices differ from those in the peso sphere.) Therefore, 
they enjoy a measure of freedom in how they spend their créditos, unlike pesos. However, this is 
only partial, since the gendered pattern of money use clearly identifies the crédito as feminine 
money. Indeed, credito expenses are almost exclusively for the reproduction of domestic units, 
as the most traded items are food, used clothes, and, to a lesser extent, sewing materials (thread 
and zips), cleaning products, and small decorating items. In addition, expenses in créditos follow 
a weekly or daily timescale and each of them represents a very small amount of money10, while 
masculine expenses are irregular and involve significant amounts of money. 
A Degree of Social Differentiation 
To some extent, women’s participation in trueque allows them to free themselves from 
patriarchy. However, in many cases, it also reinforces social differentiation in the working class. 
Temporary suspension of gender and class identities does not mean that all participants take the 
same advantage from trueque: each of them participates on the basis of her own productive and 
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commercial endowment. Yet, these resources are not equal. The most important are mobility in 
the city and access to pesos, since they allow some trueque participants to take advantage of the 
interface between monetary spheres (peso and crédito) at the expense of the poorest ones. 
In order to understand this point, it is necessary to compare the prevailing price structures 
in each sphere. Table 12.1 highlights how relative prices vary greatly from one monetary sphere 
to the other. Two points must be underlined. First, implicit conversion rates between peso and 
crédito fluctuate from one commodity to another.11 In other words, the relative prices of 
commodities depend on the unit of account in which transactions are denominated. Second, 
despite wide variations of crédito/peso ratios within the same group of commodities, the mean 
ratio is much higher for nonperishables (mainly food) than for products derived from subsidies in 
kind from social assistance, vegetables, and second-hand clothes. Yet, nonperishable foodstuffs 
must be imported from the peso sphere. There are multiple opportunities for gain when 
participants can take advantage of the interface between monetary spheres. Yet, this capacity is 
distributed highly unequally between trueque participants. 
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Table 12.1: Comparative prices (crédito/peso): Rosario 
Commodities Créditos Pesos Crédito/Peso 
   
Flour (kg) 3,500 1.30 2,692 
Sugar (kg) 3,500 2.20 1,591 
Salt (kg) 2,000 2.20 909 
Soap (piece) 3,500 1.50 2,333 
Tomato puree (can) 3,500 2.00 1,750 
Pasta (500 g) 3,500 1.50 2,333 
Mean     1,935 
Subsidies in kind     
Dry milk 8,000 >10 <800 
Vegetables       
Tomatoes (kg) 2,500 4.00 625 
Onion (kg) 2,000 1.10 1,818 
Carrots (kg) 1,000 0.75 1,333 
Pumpkin (kg) 
2,000–
2,500 
5.00 400–500 
Courgettes (piece) 1,000 1.00 1,000 
Mean     955 
Second-hand clothes    
Various >1,000     
  
Three cases illustrate the pattern. The first shows that taking advantage from the interface 
between monetary spheres can be great for participants who enjoy comfortable peso incomes. It 
involves Eleonora, Angela (her daughter), and one of Eleonora’s friends, Stefani. Stefani’s 
access to pesos is chiefly due to her husband’s income (he owns a small road-haulage business, 
has a car wash in a residential neighborhood, and sells part of his fishing catches from the Paraná 
River). Her daughter is an employee in a mutual insurance company. Stefani also has direct 
access to the peso thanks to various services she offers to elderly people in her neighborhood 
(e.g., taking them to the doctor or pharmacy, helping them with administrative tasks, etc.). 
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Angela and Eleonora run distinctive small businesses (“micro-emprendimientos”) for which 
there is a strong demand (chiropody and massage therapy in Eleonora’s case; catering, 
depilation, and makeup services in Angela’s). Their access to pesos is complemented by their 
husbands’ income: Angela’s spouse works as a truck driver while Eleonora’s works in the 
construction industry. 
Eleonora, Angela, and Stefani take advantage of the interface between the crédito and 
peso spheres by investing part of their peso incomes in trueque. They charter a small van with 
about ten neighbors to go to the ferias. They use the trip to get their supplies from a wholesaler. 
During the feria, they resell these commodities (mainly nonperishable foodstuffs). With the 
créditos obtained in this way, they buy fruit and vegetables for their own household 
consumption. The crédito/peso ratio of the commodities they sell is much higher than the normal 
ratio of the commodities they buy. This allows them to buy fruit and vegetables much cheaper 
than if they had bought them in pesos. 
This approach to the ferias is not common: only a few people whose peso incomes are 
comfortable participate in trueque. The family formed by Celina, Jorge, and their son shows that 
it is possible to take advantage of trueque without enjoying comfortable peso incomes. The only 
access they have to pesos, outside trueque, is from Joge selling cardboard picked from garbage. 
This activity generates very little money, however.12 Two of their three children also have 
governmental scholarships, but they only cover part of their schooling costs (notebooks, 
photocopies, etc.). Most of the couple’s income results from conversion between créditos and 
pesos, where Jorge’s job in Celina’s mother’s small general store (kiosko) plays a key role. Jorge 
and Celina’s mother jointly manage the kiosko, but income generated by sales of Jorge’s 
commodities goes to him. Jorge’s work in the kiosko dovetails with the couple’s participation in 
Rosario’s ferias. Apart from second-hand and new clothing (unsold items from the small 
clothing business that Célina’s sister runs), they also offer perfume and aerosol sprays 
(deodorants, mosquito repellent, etc.) salvaged from the rubbish dump of the firm producing 
them. At the trueque, Celina is in charge of the clothes and seeks out all kinds of food (yogurt, 
pasta, rice, fruit, vegetables, canned food, various sauces, etc.). Her husband is in charge of what 
he describes as the “transformation” of aerosol sprays and perfume into food. In this way, peso 
and crédito are juggled through ongoing return trips between trueque and their kiosko. Incomes 
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generated in this way (denominated in both pesos and créditos) are a result of multiple 
transactions of small amounts but a high commercial margin. 
 
Multiple Small Profits Made at the Interface between Monetary Spheres 
In November 2009, Jorge bought three soaps from a supermarket at 1.40 pesos each and then 
sold them at the trueque for 3,500 créditos apiece. With 3,000 of the 3,500 créditos, he bought 
three sponges (at 1,000 créditos each) and sold them for 2 pesos apiece in the kiosko. He 
explains: “From 1.40 pesos I get 6. And I still have 500 créditos left!” Then, thanks to the 
income generated by selling soap, Jorge bought some biscuits for 2,000 créditos. In the kiosko, 
he divided these biscuits between two boxes, selling them at 1.8 pesos apiece. With 1.50 of the 
3.60 pesos he bought a bottle of vinegar, which he then sold for 4,000 créditos in the trueque. 
Finally, with the profit made through these transactions, he bought an aerosol with missing 
pieces for 3 pesos. With the pieces he collected, he repaired and sold the aerosol for 15 pesos in 
the kiosko, and so on and so forth. The family’s access to pesos and créditos relies mainly on 
their ability to take advantage of price differences between monetary spheres. 
 
However, the household formed by Andrea, Esteban (her partner), and her son shows that 
the poorest and less mobile of the trueque participants are not in a position to do this. They live 
in one of Rosario’s poor neighborhoods; their house, which they built themselves, has only one 
room. Contrary to the previous example, the couple’s peso and crédito income are independent 
of each other. The couple’s access to pesos is limited. Esteban’s only peso income comes from 
menial day labor (painting, repair work, etc.), which amounts to only a few hours a week. He is 
sometimes paid in pesos, sometimes in building materials (for his house extension), and at other 
times in second-hand clothing. Meanwhile, Andrea cleans the toilets at a factory next to her 
house for two hours each Saturday. The couple’s main income in pesos comes from washing 
cars, which they do in front of their house (having “equipped” their garden for the job). 
However, income from this activity is highly irregular and relatively low (approximately 510 
pesos per month). Andrea only brings second-hand clothes to one of the ferias, near her house; 
these are either no longer used by them or are donated by relatives. Some clothes come as part 
payment for Estaban’s casual labor (changa). Using the créditos she earns from these sales, 
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Andrea mostly acquires other second-hand clothes and second-hand domestic products (curtains, 
mosquito repellent, cheese graters, etc.). Due to the very low sale price of second-hand clothes in 
relation to other products (table 12.1), she can only occasionally and in restricted circumstances 
obtain groceries (potatoes, apples, oil, flour, milk, pasta, etc.). Therefore, the couple meet the 
majority of their food needs by juggling several sources of poverty relief aid. This comes from a 
neighborhood association (dry milk), the Rosario municipality (for bolsón [oil], maté, sugar, salt, 
pasta, rice, etc.), and from the church (canned tuna, canned meat, sugar, maté). These resources 
are critical as they are the only regular source of foodstuffs for the household. Even so, the 
couple’s economic situation remains precarious, as shown by their chronic indebtedness. 
The social differentiation resulting from unequal shares of the gains from commerce 
should not be thought to come from the variable ability of individuals to take advantage of 
interfaces between monetary spheres. Rather, this variability translates and reinforces the 
structural inequality within the working class of access to pesos and mobility in urban space. 
Those who take advantage of interfaces can do so only because other trueque participants have 
limited access to the peso and must use the trueque to turn payments in-kind from menial labor 
or poverty-relief aid into money. 
This situation contrasts with another trueque system, located in Rosario’s northern 
suburbs. This one is based on its own bills, also denominated in créditos, but not convertible 
with the creditos circulating in Rosario. To my knowledge, this is the only case where strict 
parity between peso and credito has been maintained for each commodity. By doing so, trueque 
participants are put on an equal footing, because their gains do not rely on some groups ability to 
gain from the interface between monetary spheres, even though trueque participants are still 
highly diverse: they include small shopkeepers, women who run home-based sewing shops and 
other home-based services that are relatively well-remunerated in pesos, small clothing sellers 
who get by thanks to microcredit programs, street vendors, as well as marginalized people 
relegated to daily casual work. In other words, in this case social inequalities prevailing outside 
the trueque are suspended during the feria through relatively equal access to the means of 
settlement in créditos. Yet, this singularity is due to the fact that ferias are not ruled by 
competition between participants: maintaining strict parity between the crédito and the peso and 
the way newly issued créditos are allocated translates monetarily into a broader political project, 
based on collective emancipation of the poor. This project is supported by an organization of 
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local activists who insert the trueque into a broader set of militant activities (adult literacy 
workshops, tutoring, popular music bands [murga], microcredit, community radio, promotion of 
native languages in Amerindian slums, campaigns against domestic violence, etc.) (Saiag 
forthcoming: chap. 2). 
Treating Money as a Common Good 
The above analysis argues against simplistic views of money as an instrument either of 
oppression or domination. True, to some extent, women’s use of the local currencies under study 
provides them with some room for liberation from oppressing hierarchies based on gender: 
participation in the ferias goes hand in hand with suspension of gender and class identities and 
crédito income allows them to bypass the prevailing normative models of household financial 
management that deny women the legitimacy to generate their own income and confine them to 
domestic space. However, this emancipation from oppressive gender norms is limited by the 
inertia of the gendered social relationships incorporated in household financial organization and 
participation in trueque can lead to increasing inequality between women, if it is not embedded 
in a larger political project of collective emancipation. 
This dynamic might be better understood if we take Hart’s (2007) view that “money is 
both personal and impersonal.” On the one hand, money is personal and intimate as it marks 
interpersonal relationships within households: in this case, it is about domination, but also 
protection, if a household is considered as a unit that would protect itself against the dangers of 
highly irregular incomes, based on patriarchal norms. On the other hand, money stops being 
personal when it leaves the realm of households and enters the feria: in this case, it mediates 
highly impersonal relationships, characterized by the principle of commutability between 
individuals and by immediate settlement of debts, which does not allow bilateral relations to be 
perpetuated over time. Yet, as Hart argues, money cannot be reduced to either side of the 
personal/impersonal dichotomy; rather, it consists of a dialectical relationship between them. 
This is how the credito’s contribution to women’s emancipation should be understood: it allows 
women to bypass some of the prevailing patriarchal norms related to household financial 
management because it opens up to them the world of impersonal exchange where patriarchal 
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norms do not govern; but, at the same time, it remains embedded in household personal 
relationships, which reaffirm gender hierarchies. 
Because of these limitations, we should pay closer attention to the possible 
transformations of money’s infrastructure. Specific attention should be devoted to providing 
access to money beyond people’s participation in market transactions, since market principles 
(i.e., commutability and competition between individuals) often reproduce inequality. Yet if 
money (credit in the form of pay) is considered to be the ultimate form of social recognition 
within an economic order (Théret 1998), any guarantee for each man and woman to have access 
to and use of money on an equal footing means struggling against inequality based on class and 
gender. 
One method for achieving this end is to promote different ways for people to relate 
beyond relying exclusively on market transactions. Jean-Michel Servet (2014) and Camille 
Meyer (2012), extending Elinor Ostrom’s perspective,13 suggest that money should be treated as 
a common good. At the most abstract level, this means ensuring each person’s access to and use 
of money according to their recognized needs. This approach raises political, social, and 
economic issues and it requires us to tackle three of them simultaneously. The first is to disclose 
and challenge the gender hierarchy implicit in normative models of budgetary management. This 
would denaturalize gendered uses of money. The second is to recognize the legitimate needs of 
those who are still marginal to it. This means acknowledging women’s right to generate income 
and to spend it in their own name. Those who have been excluded from protected employment 
should have access to money beyond their subsistence needs, to have a social life with some 
dignity. This should include financing lifecycle events and having access to money to protect 
themselves when domestic budgets are destabilized. 
Finally, treating money as a common good implies establishing monetary institutions 
based on sharing. Yet sharing must be based on collective entities that can ensure effective 
access to money according to each person’s needs (Servet 2014). Admittedly, institutions of this 
kind already exist between working class neighbors. For instance, bingo is often organized to 
finance specific events for people in a precarious situation, such as healthcare needs, travel for 
funerals, visiting vulnerable parents, or school trips organized by primary and secondary 
schools.14 These events are usually organized by local associations (vecinal), churches, and 
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political parties. They can also take a less formal shape when organized among neighbors. 
School parents’ associations, known as cooperadora, can also organize such events; parents pay 
a small fee every month, managed by elected representatives, in order to contribute to school 
infrastructure or to pay for expenses related to study trips. However, as they rely above all on 
neighborhood solidarity, they fail to connect people to wider economic processes. Nor do they 
specifically confront gender issues. Treating money as a common good should therefore also be 
instituted at other levels. At the national or supranational level, this implies a fiscal system 
transferring income from the richest to the poorest, a set of measures controlling the 
remuneration of labor (minimum and maximum income, etc.), and social protection systems with 
women’s emancipation as a goal. Microfinance services adapted to the needs of women and the 
poorest would help, through revival of organizations based on mutuality or through monetary 
systems not based on market principles. It is important to make visible existing sharing 
mechanisms that explicitly tackle gender issues and to invent new ones. More democratic 
approaches to managing money could reverse gender inequality (Singh, this volume). 
 
Hadrien Saiag is a permanent research fellow (chargé de recherché) in economic anthropology 
at the CNRS in Paris (IIAC-LAIOS). His research focuses on working-class monetary practices 
in Argentina and the incorporation of the Argentinian sub-proletariat into consumer credit. He is 
the author of Monnaies locales et economies populaires en Argentine (2016). 
References 
Absi, P. 2007. “Il ne faut pas mélanger les fortunes: travail, genre et revenus chez les 
commerçantes de Bolivie.” In V. Hernandez et al. (eds.), Turbulences monétaires et 
sociales: l’Amérique Latine dans une perspective comparée. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 
355–393. 
Bogani, E., and J. Parysow. 2005. “Perspectivas de desarrollo económico y social para las 
mujeres pobres y empobrecidas en los Clubes del Trueque. Estudio de caso: ‘La 
Bernalesa.’” In F. Mallimaci and A. Salvia (eds.), Los nuevos rostros de la marginalidad. 
Buenos-Aires: Biblios, pp. 151–173. 
	 20	
Carsten, J. 1989. “Cooking money: Gender and the symbolic transformation of means of 
exchange in a Malay fishing community.” In J. P. Parry and M. Bloch (eds.), Money & 
the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 117–141. 
Damill, M., R. Frenkel, and R. Maurizio. 2011. “Macroeconomic policy for full and productive 
employment and decent work for all: An analysis of the Argentine experience.” Paper 
presented at Pro-employment macroeconomic frameworks, sectoral strategies for 
employment creation and the informal economy. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization. 
Drelon, S. 2009. “Le club de troc de Roca Negra, une expérience particulière du troc en 
Argentine. Etude des modes de production et de circulation des biens et leur impact sur 
les rapports de valeur et d’échange.” PhD dissertation, Université Paris Descartes, Paris. 
Gomez, G., and A. Helmsing. 2008. “Selective spatial closure and local economic development: 
What do we learn from the Argentine local currency systems?” World Development 
36(11): 2489–2511. 
González Bombal, I. 2002. “Sociabilidad en clases medias en descenso: Experiencias en el 
trueque.” In L. Beccaria et al. (eds.), Sociedad y sociabilidad en la Argentina de los 90. 
Buenos Aires: Biblios. 
Guérin, I. 2002. “Le sexe de la monnaie.” Journal des Anthropologues 90–91: 213–230. 
———. 2008. “L’argent des femmes pauvres: Entre survie quotidienne, obligations familiales et 
normes sociales.” Revue Française de Socio-Économie 2: 59–78. 
Hart, K. 2007. “Money is always personal and impersonal.” Anthropology Today 23(5): 12–16. 
Johnson, S. 2004. “Gender norms in financial markets: Evidence from Kenya.” World 
Development 32(8): 1355–1374. 
La Pradelle, M. de. 2006. Market-day in Provence. Chicago, IL, and London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Leoni, F. 2003. “Ilusión para muchos, alternativa para pocos. La práctica del trueque en los 
sectores populares.” Bachelor’s Thesis in Social Policy, Universidad Nacional de General 
Sarmiento, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
Meyer, C. 2012. “Les finances solidaires comme biens communs durables : étude de ca sde la 
Banque communautaire de développement Palmas (Brésil).” MA thesis, Université Libre 
de Bruxelles, Belgium. 
	 21	
Orzi, R. (ed.) 2012. La moneda social como lazo social. Buenos Aires: Ciccus. 
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Ould-Ahmed, P. 2010. “Can a community currency be independent of the state currency? A case 
study of the credito in Argentina (1995–2008).” Environment and Planning 42(6): 1346–
64. 
Parry, J., and M. Bloch. (eds.) 1989. Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pereyra, F. 2007. “Exploring gender divisions in a community currency scheme: The case of the 
barter network in Argentina.” International Journal of Community Currency Research 
11: 98–111. 
Rofman, R., and L. Lucchetti. 2006. “Pension systems in Latin America: Concepts and 
measurements of coverage social protection discussion.” Social Protection Discussion 
Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Saiag, H. 2013. “Le trueque Argentin ou la question du fédéralisme monétaire (1995–2002).” 
Revue Française de Socio-Économie 12: 69–89. 
———. 2015. “Une libération impossible? Marché, genre et monnaie dans le trueque argentin.” 
In J.-M. Servet and I. Hillenkamp (ed.), Comprendre autrement le marché. Marchés réels 
et marché fantasmé. Paris: Classiques Garnier, pp. 145–169. 
———. Forthcoming. Monnaies locales et économie populaire en Argentine. Paris: Karthala 
(Coll. Recherches Internationales). 
Servet, J.-M. 2009. “Toward an alternative economy: Reconsidering the market, money and 
value.” In C. Hann and K. Hart (eds.), Market and Society: The great Transformation 
Today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5–90. 
———. 2014. “De nouvelles formes de partage: La solidarité au delà de l’économie 
collaborative.” Publications de l’Institut Veblen, Paris. Available at http://www.veblen-
institute.org/De-nouvelles-formes-de-partage-la (accessed 7 July 2014). 
Sosa, R. 2007. “El oncepto de trabajo en un cambio de época. Un estudio sobre la restauracion 
contemporanea del capital y los impactos objectivos y subjectifos en el mndo del trabajo 
en Argentina (1976–2006).” PhD dissertation, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, 
Argentina. 
	 22	
Théret, B. 1998. “La dulité des dettes et de la monnaie dans les sociétés salariales.” In M. 
Aglietta and A. Orléan (eds.), La monnaie souveraine. Paris: Odile Jacob, pp. 253–287. 
Zelizer, V. 1994. The Social Meaning of Money. New York: Basic Books. 
Notes 																																																								
A previous version of this work was published in French (Saiag 2015). 
1. Rosario, located on the Parana River about 400 km northeast of Buenos Aires, is the third 
largest city in Argentina with almost 1.2 million inhabitants in 2010.  
2. Evelyn Arach, “La postal que resurge con la crisis,” Rosario 12, 8 July 2009. 
3. In this I follow the lead of Jean-Michel Servet. 
4. Names have been changed in order to preserve interviewees’ anonymity. 
5. Wives’ expenses are supposedly in the name of the household (see the next section). 
6. Indeed, men’s and women’s incomes do not usually have the same temporality. Men are either 
paid daily (contingent labor), weekly, semimonthly, or monthly, while women’s daily income 
must be evaluated by a complex calculation of cost. 
7. Only one interviewee was in this situation while she lived with her concubine. 
8. Women’s expenditures use either money from their husband or, when necessary, from income 
they generated themselves. Men’s expenditures draw exclusively on money transferred by the 
husband. 
9. This gender differentiation of spending responsibilities is firmly fixed in people’s practices. 
For instance, grandmothers who benefit from retirement pensions are usually expected to 
contribute to daily food expenses, while the monthly rhythm of their income fits perfectly with 
their being exempt from paying fixed costs. 
10. Crédito bills have very low denominations: during my fieldwork, the highest denomination 
bill was 500 créditos, between 0.25 and 0.50 pesos, while a bus ticket cost 1.75 pesos. 
11. Implicit conversion rates are obtained by dividing the price of a commodity denominated in 
créditos by the price of the same commodity in pesos. 
12. Cardboard is sold for $0.30/kg. 
13. Servet (2014) emphasizes Ostrom’s (2005) idea that the use and the production of the 
commons are characterized by a democratic relationship between stakeholders and by the 
concern for social and environmental sustainability. He adds that determining one person’s 
access to the commons implies taking into consideration its recognized needs. 
14. Money is not the only object treated as a common good within popular neighborhoods. 
Vecinales, for instance, often provide a room for funerals, birthdays, and key life-cycle events at 
very reasonable cost. Local churches and political parties may practice something similar. 
Solidarity among neighbors is also important when it comes to rebuilding houses destroyed by 
fire or bad weather.	
